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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FIFTH AMENDMENT AND TAKINGS—COURTS
AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS WILL IMPEDE ORDERLY CITY DEVELOPMENT
BY LIMITING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ USE OF EXACTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT
PLANNING. KOONTZ V. ST. JOHNS RIVER WATER MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, 133
S. CT. 2586 (2013).
I. INTRODUCTION
Few consider how cities come to own their public parks or waterfront
nature preserves. Most take these types of government amenities for granted
and are surprised when they discover the source for a public space is a private owner who gave the land to the city in exchange for the city’s allowing
an expansion of the private owner’s enterprises. For example, a developer
who files a permit requesting permission to develop some of his protected
wetlands could be required by the city to dedicate a large portion of the remaining undeveloped land to the city as a conservation easement in order to
offset the potential harms resulting from the new development.1
Government deals with private owners are called exactions.2 Put simply, exactions are conditions that local governments may require of property
owners in return for the grant of permits that allow the intensified use of real
property.3 Common examples are “mandatory dedications of land, fees required in lieu of dedication, and impact fees given by property owners in
exchange for permits, zoning changes, and other regulatory clearances.”4
While landowners might view exactions as a hindrance to development, they
are essential tools for municipalities seeking to protect the public interest by
guiding development in a certain direction when granting land use permits.5
Exactions law developed out of two constitutional concepts: the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause and the principle of unconstitutional conditions.6 The Takings Clause states, “nor shall private property be taken for

1. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
2. See Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 611 (2004) [hereinafter Fenster, Takings
Formalism].
3. See id.
4. Id. at 613.
5. See, e.g., Timothy M. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 511,
512–13 (2012) [hereinafter Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future].
6. See generally, Julie A. Tappendorf & Mattew T. DiCianni, The Big Chill? — The
Likely Impact of Koontz on the Local Government/Developer Relationship, 30 TOURO L.
REV. 455 (2014) [hereinafter Tappendorf & DiCianni, Takings Law Today] (providing an
overview of the development of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); Robert Meltz,
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public use, without just compensation.”7 The Supreme Court of the United
States interpreted this to mean that the government, using its police power,
may appropriate private property for the health, safety, and welfare of the
public, so long as it provides just compensation for the property taken.8 Until the early twentieth century, the Court recognized only two types of takings: (1) a formal appropriation of property and (2) a permanent physical
invasion of property.9 In 1922, the Court handed down a decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon10 that gave birth to the notion of “regulatory
takings.”11 The Court held that when a government regulation of land use
goes “too far,” a taking might result despite the absence of formal appropriation or physical invasion.12 In the late twentieth century, beginning with
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,13 the Court began
setting forth guidelines for determining how far is “too far,” and which regulations affect a taking and thus require just compensation.14
Exactions are a subset of takings jurisprudence in that most of the cases
arise because a local government has placed limits on how a person may use
his property via a condition that must be fulfilled before the permit for the
use is granted.15 However, unlike the deferential Penn Central balancing test
most regulatory takings claims receive,16 exactions are reviewed under a
rule-formalist heightened scrutiny.17

Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 328 (2007) (providing an overview of the development of takings jurisprudence).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241–42 (1946).
9. See Meltz, supra note 6, at 328.
10. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
11. See Meltz, supra note 6, at 328.
12. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
13. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
14. The factors in Penn Central include: (1) the character of the government action
restricting the claimant’s property rights; (2) the economic impact of the regulation; and (3)
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct, investment-backed expectations. Id. at 124. For a more thorough discussion of takings jurisprudence, see Meltz, supra
note 6.
15. See Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 614. For a brief explanation of
regulations in Koontz, see BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE
LAW & LITIGATION § 3:31 (2014 ed.).
16. See, e.g., Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 612.
17. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391–92 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834–36 (1987); infra Part II.B. The “essential nexus” and “rough
proportionality” tests of Nollan and Dolan require courts to consider a “prescribed, focused
logic” when examining exactions. Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 611, 629.
“Thus, the test differ[s] strikingly from the . . . open-ended inquiry of Penn Central.” See id.
at 629.
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The idea of “unconstitutional conditions” was introduced in 1910 in
two Supreme Court cases.18 The doctrine “forbids burdening the Constitution’s enumerated rights by coercively withholding benefits from those who
exercise them.”19 Thus, the government may not condition the receipt of a
discretionary benefit on the recipient’s relinquishment of a constitutionally
protected right.20 While the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions evolved
over the course of the twentieth century, the Court did not use it to regulate
exactions until the latter part of the century.21 As exactions require landowners to forfeit the constitutionally protected right to use their property in
whatever way they see fit in exchange for permits, unconstitutional conditions was the “logical underpinning” for the Court to use in developing exactions jurisprudence.22
Theoretically, the purpose behind exactions is to put the burden of mitigating harm that may result from intensified land use on the person proposing the intensified use.23 Until recently, however, municipal governments
had little regulation concerning how they could use these exactions.24 If a
developer wanted to build a new shopping center, the city could require him
to dedicate part of the land as a street right-of-way.25 Or a business owner
might request that the city rezone an area so that the business sits in a commercial zone rather than residential; the city will grant the permit, as long as
he also dedicates a parcel of his property to the city for use in future highway expansion.26
During its efforts to delineate the standards for takings jurisprudence it
had established in the late 1900s, the Supreme Court began to limit the way
18. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 51 (1910) (White, J.,
concurring); Pullman Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 56, 69–70 (1910) (White, J.,
concurring).
19. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013).
20. Tappendorf & DiCianni, Takings Law Today, supra note 6, at 456. Tappendorf and
DiCianni provided an example of a television station’s receipt of government funding: “the
government cannot force a television station receiving public funds to refrain from endorsing
a candidate for public office because then the constitutionally protected right (freedom of
speech) would be impermissibly burdened by the government’s refusal to provide public
funds to the television station.” Id. at 456–57.
21. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 407; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 859; Tappendorf & DiCianni, Takings Law Today, supra note 6, at 458.
22. Tappendorf & DiCianni, Takings Law Today, supra note 6, at 458.
23. See, e.g., Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 516; Fenster, Takings
Formalism, supra note 2, at 613.
24. See J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the “Essential Nexus”: How State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 374–76 (2002).
25. See City of Jonesboro v. Vuncannon, 310 Ark. 366, 368–69, 837 S.W.2d 286, 287
(1992).
26. See Goss v. City of Little Rock, 90 F.3d 306, 307 (8th Cir. 1996).
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local government could require exactions.27 In Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission28 and Dolan v. City of Tigard,29 the Court set out a two-pronged
test to determine if an exaction violated the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions to rise to the level of a taking under the Fifth Amendment purposes.30 First, per Nollan, exactions must bear an “essential nexus” to the
harm prevented,31 and second, per Dolan, the condition imposed must be
roughly proportional to the adverse impact of the project on the community.32
After these landmark cases, municipalities still had some leeway when
granting land use permits.33 There were two primary methods to get around
the test.34 First, local governments could require the owner to pay a monetary exaction, or pay toward the costs of mitigating any perceived harms,
rather than granting an actual portion of his or her land.35 Second, local governments would simply deny the permit should the landowner refuse the
condition attached; thus the exaction escapes the scrutiny of the
Nollan/Dolan test.36 This note focuses on the latter.
In its June 2013 decision of Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District,37 the Supreme Court held that both monetary exactions and
failed exactions are subject to the Nollan/Dolan rough proportionality test.38
This decision in Koontz creates more questions than it resolves. While ostensibly expanding the individual rights of property owners, the decision
may have an adverse impact on community growth as it limits and confuses
local government control over the granting of land use permits. This article
proposes that, in order to prevent adverse effects on community development, regulation of government exactions is better left to state legislatures
and administrative review boards.
Part II of this note provides a brief history of how exactions have affected city development up to current times, and then describes Nollan, Dolan, and Koontz. Part III discusses some of the ramifications of the Koontz
decision on city growth and development, looks into the confusion Koontz
27. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
28. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
29. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
30. See id. at 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
31. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
32. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
33. See Breemer, supra note 24, at 375.
34. See id.; Mark Fenster, Failed Exactions, 36 VT. L. REV. 623, 624 (2012).
35. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 624.
36. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687
(1999). See also Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 624.
37. 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
38. Id. at 2595, 2599.
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will cause in future litigation, and then provides a better method of examining exactions, that is, through state legislatures and administrative review
boards.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The History of Exactions

Exactions arose in the early nineteenth century as a municipal effort to
force rogue developers into taking responsibility for the societal harms their
developments caused.39 To develop land in the decades leading up to the
1930s, a developer needed only “a whim, a pen, and a map.”40 This led to an
overabundance of developed lots without amenities such as utility services
or roads, which naturally no one wanted, and thus led to an abundance of
vacant lots and tax delinquency on the part of the developers.41 This caused
sporadic and disorderly growth, as no developers wished to continue work
on this “dead land” property that was essentially uninhabitable and would
simply move further out of town to develop again.42
The Standard Planning Enabling Act of 1928 sought to remedy the
problem by recommending that municipalities condition permit approval
upon the developer providing essential necessities.43 The city could require
the developer to build “streets, water mains, sewer lines, and other utility
structures” in order to cope with the increased population and its impact in
the subdivision and surrounding area.44 Thus, the institutionalized government exaction was born.45 These original exactions mostly required “direct
infrastructural enhancement”—meaning they focused on mitigating impacts
that the developer could remedy on the developed land itself such as providing drainage systems, sidewalks, or road improvements in the developed
area.46 During and following the Great Depression, developers and the real
estate community challenged these conditional requirements as they became

39. See ALVIN L. ARNOLD & MARSHALL E. TRACHT, 1 CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT FINANCING § 2:82 (3d ed. 2013).
40. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 516.
41. R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 5–6 (1987).
42. Id.
43. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 517.
44. See id.; Jennifer Evans-Cowley, Development Exactions: Process and Planning
Issues, at 3 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper WP06JEC1, 2006).
45. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 517.
46. Id.
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a burden during the economic downturn, but they never gained sympathy in
court.47
By the 1940s, conditioning permit approval upon on-site, harmmitigating requirements had become the norm in most cities.48 Following
World War II, local governments began imposing off-site requirements to
mitigate the harm that came with the “mass suburbanization” of the 1950s.49
These external exactions might require the developer to contribute, either
directly by providing labor and materials or financially through a monetary
exaction, to “wastewater facilities, schools, public parks, precinct houses,
fire stations, or even day care services,” services to which their development
had no connection.50
Naturally, developers fought these off-site, external exactions, arguing
that they were “inequit[able], inefficien[t], and general[ly] ineffective[] in
what they saw as a piecemeal, ad hoc land use permitting process.”51 The
general public, however, found exactions to be preferable to the other option
of increasing local taxes to pay for these public projects.52 By the latter part
of the twentieth century, exactions had become a standard tool wielded by
local governments when issuing approvals for land use, especially in areas
with fast-growing populations.53 This time developers gained some traction
when they brought suit challenging the conditions, usually in the form of
state laws or state supreme court decisions imposing small limitations on
municipalities.54 A common trend among states was to impose a “reasonable
relationship” test that weighed the burdens and benefits to the developer.55
47. See, e.g., Ridgefield Land Co. v. Detroit, 217 N.W. 58 (Mich. 1928) (holding developer required to provide subdivision street dedications); Mefford v. City of Tulare, 228 P.2d
847 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951) (ruling developer required to provide sewers); Brous v. Smith,
106 N.E.2d 503 (N.Y. 1952) (holding developer required to provide roadway improvements);
Petterson v. City of Naperville, 137 N.E.2d 371 (Ill. 1956) (ruling developer required to
provide gutters and curbs).
48. See Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 518.
49. Id.; see Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954) (holding that the state’s police
power for takings may be used to make communities beautiful and desirable, and not solely
for public health, safety, and morality purposes).
50. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 518; see also Evans-Cowley,
supra note 44, at 3.
51. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 518.
52. See Evans-Cowley, supra note 44, at 3.
53. See Mark Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Context of Exactions, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 734 (2007) [hereinafter Fenster, Regulating Land Use].
54. See Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 518–19.
55. See, e.g., Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1976) (holding there
must be “a reasonable relationship between the approval of the subdivision and the municipality’s need for land”); Simpson v. City of N. Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297 (Neb. 1980) (stating
that the test is “whether the requirement has some reasonable relationship or nexus to the use
to which the property is being made or is merely being used as an excuse for taking property
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Exactions have become an essential tool for municipalities when making long-range development plans and have extended beyond simple land
dedication or utility easements.56 Monetary exactions, or cash payments,
have become another way of mitigating potential harm caused by heightened land use.57 These methods became an alternative to dedications of land
or other physical exactions when those traditional exactions were “inconvenient, too small, or otherwise did not account for the perceived needs of
the development.”58 The “mitigation fees” or “impact fees” can be imposed
by a local government as a condition to approving a development permit or
some other land use action, such as rezoning.59 Monetary exactions have
become useful tools for municipalities to supplement both state and federal
subsidies to local governments and in preventing tax increases as an alternative.60 Until recently, municipalities had discretion to impose either land
dedication or monetary exactions as needed.61
B.

The Supreme Court Takes Action in Nollan and Dolan

Starting in 1987, the Supreme Court of the United States began placing
limits on exactions used by municipalities.62 In two landmark cases, Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, the Court
developed a two-part test to determine if the exaction imposed by the city

simply because at that particular moment the landowner is asking the city for some license or
permit”); City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984) (holding
that to be valid, the exaction must “be ‘substantially related’ to the health, safety, or general
welfare of the people . . . [and] be reasonable”); Call v. City of W. Jordan, 606 P.2d 217
(Utah 1979) (ruling that “the dedication should have some reasonable relationship to the
needs created by the subdivision”); Jordan v. Vill. of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442
(Wis. 1965) (holding that “[t]he test of reasonableness is always applicable to any attempt to
exercise the police power”).
56. See, e.g., Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 734; Mulvaney, Exactions
for the Future, supra note 5, at 518–19.
57. See Lauren Reznick, The Death of Nollan and Dolan? Challenging the Constitutionality of Monetary Exactions in the Wake of Lingle v. Chevron, 87 B.U. L. REV. 725, 737
(2007).
58. Id.
59. Id.; see also Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996) (discussing the City’s requirement that a developer pay a “mitigation fee” as a condition for approval
of a rezoning permit).
60. See Reznick, supra note 57, at 738. For further discussion on the impacts of exactions on public tax policy, see Evans-Cowley, supra note 44.
61. See, e.g., Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 734; Breemer, supra note
24, at 375.
62. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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had gone past a mere exaction to become a taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.63
1.

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and an “Essential Nexus”

In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Nollans sought to
convert an oceanfront cottage into a three-bedroom home, which would
have blocked the public’s view of the ocean.64 The California Coastal Commission approved the permit on condition that the Nollans provide a public
walking easement along the ocean in front of the property, which would
have resulted in a permanent dedication of part of their property.65 The
Nollans lost in state court and eventually brought their appeal to the Supreme Court.66
The Court determined that the easement dedication did not, and could
never, alleviate the immediate developmental impact of expanding the
home.67 It held that in order for an exaction to pass constitutional muster, the
government agency must prove that it bears an “essential nexus” to the impacts caused by the development requested.68 Without that essential nexus,
the Court likened the situation to a “California law forb[idding] shouting fire
in a crowded theater, but grant[ing] dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury.”69 In short, the Court stated, “unless the
permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development
ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but ‘an outand-out plan of extortion.’”70
In his dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out several problems with the
Court’s analysis, noting first that the easement attached to the permit did in
fact respond to the specific burden placed on the public in granting the
Nollans’s permit.71 He also noted that the Commission’s action did not im63. See Nollan, 483 U.S. 825; Dolan, 512 U.S. 374.
64. Nollan, 483 U.S at 827–30.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 838.
68. Id. at 836–37.
69. Id. at 837.
70. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14–
15 (N.H. 1981)).
71. Id. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[The Commission] has determined that the
Nollans’ burden on access would be offset by a deed restriction that formalizes the public’s
right to pass along the shore. In its informed judgment, such a tradeoff would preserve the net
amount of public access to the coastline. The Court’s insistence on a precise fit between the
forms of burden and condition on each individual parcel along the California coast would
penalize the Commission for its flexibility, hampering the ability to fulfill its public trust
mandate.”).
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plicate any constitutional concerns under the takings clause, specifically the
economic impact of the regulation and the extent to which it interferes with
investment-backed expectations.72
2.

Dolan v. City of Tigard and Rough Proportionality

In Dolan v. City of Tigard, Ms. Dolan requested a permit to expand her
plumbing and electrical supply store and pave over a gravel parking lot
along a creek.73 The Tigard City Planning Commission approved the permit
upon the condition that she dedicate a strip of her land to the city for floodplain management and a bicycle path.74 Once again, Ms. Dolan lost all state
court appeals.75
Dolan was the first case in which the Court explicitly used unconstitutional conditions to rule on land use exactions, although it stated that the
holding in Nollan was an application of the doctrine.76 The Court stated that
the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right—
here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use—in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property. 77
Rejecting the “reasonably related” standard most state courts had used,78 the
Court held:
[A] term such as “rough proportionality” best encapsulates what we hold
to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical
calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development. 79

These cases left two unresolved questions for city planning commissions: (1) whether a monetary exaction is subject to the Nollan/Dolan test
and (2) whether a failed exaction, where a permit is denied before a condition is attached, is subject to Nollan and Dolan.80

72. Id. at 853–57 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)). Notably, Justice Brennan would have the Court apply the less rigorous Penn Central
test already in place for regulating takings rather than create a new standard for exactions.
73. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377–83 (1994).
74. Id. at 379–80.
75. Id. at 382–83.
76. Id. at 385.
77. Id.
78. See supra note 55.
79. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
80. Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 624.
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Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586
(2013)

In spring 2013, the Court answered these two questions in Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Management District.81 Mr. Koontz sought a permit from
St. Johns River Water Management District (“the District”) to develop part
of his property, which, consistent with Florida law, requires permit applicants wishing to build on wetlands to offset the resulting environmental
damage.82 Mr. Koontz offered to mitigate the environmental effects of his
development proposal by deeding to the District a conservation easement on
nearly three-quarters of his property, the entire portion that he did not plan
to develop.83
The District rejected Mr. Koontz’s proposal, however, and gave him
the option of choosing between: (1) reducing the size of his development
and, inter alia, deeding to the District a conservation easement on the resulting larger remainder of his property, or (2) hiring contractors to improve
District-owned wetlands several miles away.84 Believing the District’s demands to be excessive in light of the environmental effects his proposal
would have caused, Mr. Koontz filed suit under a state law that provides
money damages for agency action that is an “unreasonable exercise of the
state’s police power constituting a taking without just compensation.”85 Both
the trial and appellate courts found that the District’s actions violated Nollan
and Dolan and therefore constituted a taking, but the Supreme Court of Florida reversed and held that Mr. Koontz did not have a claim because the
Nollan/Dolan test did not apply to applications for permits or to monetary
exactions.86
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court determined that Mr.
Koontz’s property had in fact been taken per the Fifth Amendment.87 The
Court again used the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to state that the
government could not coerce people into giving up certain rights.88 Nollan
and Dolan “‘involve a special application’ of this doctrine that protects the
Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for property the government
takes when owners apply for land use permits.”89 Notably, the Court held
81. See 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
82. Id. at 2591–94.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2593.
85. Id.
86. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1231 (Fla. 2011),
rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
87. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. at 2596.
88. Id. at 2595.
89. Id. at 2594 (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 (2005); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)).
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that “the principles that undergird the decisions in Nollan and Dolan do not
change depending on whether the government approves a permit on the
condition that the applicant turn over property or denies a permit because
the applicant refuses to do so.”90 The Court purported to recognize that the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine forbids burdening the Constitution’s
enumerated rights by coercively withholding benefits from the people who
exercise those rights, regardless of whether the government ultimately succeeds in pressuring someone into forfeiting those rights.91
The District argued that it was allowed to deny Mr. Koontz’s application outright with no option to pay for the improvements mentioned without
violating the Constitution, but the Court declared it made no difference.92
The Court recognized that this may cause a problem when deciding what
remedy to provide: the Fifth Amendment states that the remedy for an unconstitutional taking is just compensation, but when a permit is denied before a condition is attached, nothing has been taken.93 The Court, however,
failed to resolve this problem, remanding the case back to Florida and leaving the question of what remedy to provide to the lower court.94 Ultimately,
the Court held that: (1) a local government’s demand for property from a
land use permit applicant must satisfy the Nollan/Dolan requirements, even
when it denies the permit, and (2) a local government’s demand for money
from a land use applicant must satisfy the Nollan/Dolan requirements.95
In her dissent, Justice Kagan expressed concerns about the Court’s role
in this decision, stating:
The majority turns a broad array of local land use regulations into federal
constitutional questions. It deprives the state and local governments of
the flexibility they need to enhance their communities—to ensure environmentally sound and economically productive development. It places
courts smack in the middle of the most everyday local government activity.96

As Justice Kagan stated, the Court effectively curtailed all local governing power to regulate land use in a manner practicable to each municipality’s specific needs by forcing its holding into the conditional permit process, which is a distinctly local issue.97 This decision will lead to ramifica90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2596.
93. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2597.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2599, 2603.
96. Id. at 2612 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Although Justice Kagan’s dissent primarily focused on the majority’s holding that monetary exactions are subject to Nollan and Dolan, her
analysis applies likewise to permit denials.
97. Id. at 2607.
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tions in city development not intended by the Court and provides an unworkable standard for lower courts hearing disputes.
III. ARGUMENT
A.

Unintended Ramifications in City Development

Requiring city planning agencies to examine proposed conditions in the
light of Nollan’s “rough proportionality” and Dolan’s “essential nexus” will
cause a detrimental effect on land use negotiations, which will lead to undesirable results in city development.98 Municipalities will forgo negotiations
altogether, resulting in outright denials, over-regulation, or no development;99 or municipalities will approve permits with significantly less stringent conditions attached, leading to under-regulation and mass chaos in development.100
1.

The Effect on Conditional Permit Negotiations

The Court’s decision in Koontz appears initially to create a manageable
way of preventing “extortionate” demands from local land use agencies.101 It
allows landowners to bring suit challenging those demands rather than face
a permit denial after extended negotiations.102 At first glance, it seems logical to allow a developer whose permit is denied because he stood in the face
of an extortionate request and refused to cave to an inappropriate exaction to
avail himself of Nollan and Dolan, just as one who submits to the demand
98. Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 654–68.
99. Id. at 661–65. Because of the litigation risks involved in negotiating with landowners over a mitigating condition, local governments may simply deny proposals outright rather
than impose necessary exactions that Koontz has made “vulnerable to constitutional challenges. . . . Even when a developer or property owner would willingly choose an expensive condition over an outright denial, the burdens and risks imposed by the nexus and proportionality
tests can keep local governments from offering such conditions.” Id. at 662.
100. Id. at 654–61. Communities are often caught in between two potential litigants: that
of property owners wishing to expand, and political interest groups who oppose either specific plans or development in general. Id. In light of Koontz, property owners can now come to
court armed with their constitutional rights, a “powerful weapon” that third party litigants
cannot raise, regardless of whether the local government has finalized the condition or if it has
merely suggested a starting point from which further negotiations will follow. See id.
101. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 277,
300 (2011), [hereinafter Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions].
102. See id. Prior to Koontz, the only remedy for a developer whose permit had been
denied was to argue an unconstitutional taking under the more deferential Penn Central test.
Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 617. The only way to have access to the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan was to agree to the exaction, allow it to attach to the permit, and then challenge it in court. See Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at
301.
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and allows the condition to attach to the permit can.103 In practice, however,
the decision in Koontz is likely to have a cooling effect on compromise negotiations between landowners and land use agencies, which will ultimately
hurt both developers and the general public as well as invite baseless litigation in federal court over a local issue.104
It is common practice for land use agencies and developers to negotiate
a compromise during the application approval process.105 Subjecting an exaction to the heightened scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan test at the moment it is
proposed, however, could foreclose the possibility of such a negotiating
session ever taking place.106 Koontz dictates that governmental land use
agencies face a constitutional challenge in federal court if they simply enter
negotiations with an offer that the landowner views as extortionate, a challenge that many communities are ill-equipped to face.107 This potential liability will cause these agencies to deny permit applications outright rather
than enter risky negotiations for which they could be held to the
Nollan/Dolan standard.108 Thus, city-planning commissions will be reluctant
to even consider negotiations with developers to reach a satisfactory exchange.109
Alternatively, now that the negotiations themselves rather than the final
deal must be roughly proportional and bear an essential nexus to the anticipated harm, local governments may simply refuse to enter negotiations and
force the developer to offer “sweeteners” such as “workforce housing, oversized water and sewer pipes, [or] community recreational facilities,” in order
to obtain expansion permits.110

103. See Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 301.
104. See id. Justice Kagan, in her Koontz dissent, stated that by applying Nolan and
Dollan to permit conditions, “the majority extends the Takings Clause, with its notoriously
‘difficult’ and ‘perplexing’ standards, into the very heart of local land use regulation and
service delivery.” Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2607 (2013)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998)). Again, Justice
Kagan’s reference to the Court’s holding regarding monetary exactions is equally applicable
to permit denials. See id.
105. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 308.
106. Id.; see, e.g., Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 644.
107. Mulvaney, Propsed Exactions, supra note 101, at 301–02; see also Amicus Brief at
12–13, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (No.
11-1447), 2012 WL 6755147, at *12–13 (“Applying Nollan and Dolan beyond the context of
actual exactions would lead to more intrusive and frequent legal challenges to land use decisions, undermining local governments’ capacity to carry out their planning and regulatory
responsibilities.”).
108. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 301–02.
109. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 644; David L. Callies, Koontz
Redux: Where We Are and What’s Left, 65 PLAN. & ENVTL. LAW 7 (2013).
110. Callies, supra note 109, at 7.
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By forcing unapproved permits into the Nollan/Dolan test, many city
planning organizations, formerly willing to discuss possible conditions that
could alleviate both parties’ concerns, will simply deny permits without
even entering negotiations in order to face the lesser standard of the Penn
Central test rather than the heightened scrutiny Koontz requires should a
lawsuit arise.111 This will naturally lead to stagnated development, especially
in smaller areas that are seeking economic as well as physical growth, but
may not have the resources to fight large-scale battles in court. There are
many reasons for a municipality to deny a land use permit,112 and exactions
are necessary tools that give local land use agencies the flexibility they need
to protect public health and safety and promote development schemes for
the general welfare.113
On the other hand, rather than denying applications outright, local land
use agencies may begin to simply forgo placing conditions on land use applications altogether, which could result in massive harm to the general public.114 The exaction system was created to regulate development that serves
the interests of both the developer and the public, but this system could now
ultimately have the opposite effect by allowing unregulated development.115
This creates the worst possible result: local land use agencies will be unable
to negotiate adequate, workable mitigation compromises with developers;
developers will be denied conditional permit approvals from wary agencies;
and the entire regulatory process will become more rigid and mechanical,
resulting in more denials and fewer negotiated compromises to serve local
and developer interests.116 Nobody wins.

111. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 644.
112. City regulations regarding land use are not “components of a permanent, fixed
scheme,” but rather “a negotiable set of parameters” used to create “relationships with property owners seeking to change the use of their property.” Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra
note 2, at 623. The negotiation process is essential to this development scheme, as is the
necessity that some permits be denied. See id.; Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note
101, at 303–04.
113. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, The Remnants of Exaction Takings, 33 ENVIRONS
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 189, 214–15 (2010) [hereinafter Mulvaney, Remnants].
114. See, e.g., Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 308–09. Likewise,
under-regulation leads to windfalls on the part of the landowner at the expense of the public.
Id. at 308 n.160. But see Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1, 5 (2000).
115. See Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 308–09; Mulvaney, Remnants, supra note 113, at 214–15.
116. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 644; ARNOLD & TRACHT, supra note
39, at § 2:82.
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The Effect on City Development

Not only will requiring land use permits to meet the Nollan/Dolan
standard before they are approved result in fewer negotiated compromises
between land use regulators and landowners, reaching long-term goals will
be much more difficult for cities.117 Land use planning allows cities to guide
development by limiting the type and degree of allowable intensified use of
property and zoning.118 It usually reflects a municipality’s “long-term design, economic conditions, geography, and environmental resources.”119
Thus, exactions are generally in line with the land use policies of the community and are part of planning processes that broadly assess local needs
and objectives.120
By using exactions to reach these community goals, local governments
are able to shift the costs of a proposed project’s negative impacts from the
general public (in the form of taxes) to the developer who is ultimately responsible for causing the harm.121 In this way, local government can regulate
and limit land use development for the general welfare without imposing
additional costs.122 Thus, exactions have become key regulatory tools in a
narrow, local environment where elected and appointed officials can wield
their power to further the interests of the community in land development.123
By requiring that an exaction fit the Nollan/Dolan test at its inception,
however, the Court in Koontz has created “a near per se rule against using
exactions for the future” as an effort to prevent or control certain types of
city development.124 When a city is imposing exactions that fit a broad, future plan, it is almost impossible for it to demonstrate that the exaction bears
an essential nexus or is roughly proportional to the development proposed.125
117. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 529; see also Amicus Brief at
4–5, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 11-1447),
2012 WL 6759407, at *4–5 (“Each day in countless communities across the country, land use
planning and zoning officials negotiate with developers over permit conditions that promote
responsible development—including, as in this case, conditions that mitigate related environmental harms. These negotiations typically end with agreed-upon conditions, tailored to
each unique proposal, that allow development to go forward, while also providing mitigating
benefits to account for the very real costs development can impose upon the community at
large.”).
118. See Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 529.
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., id. at 536, 540–41; Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 623.
121. See Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 735.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 542.
125. See, e.g., id.; Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 615 (“Rather, the Court’s
efforts to describe and prescribe exactions so misunderstand the complicated dynamics of
land use regulation that they result in variable and unfortunate consequences—including,
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There is necessarily some uncertainty when developing a long-term city
plan, and local governments need flexibility when placing conditions on
permits in order to achieve these goals.126
By placing unapproved conditional permits under the scrutiny of
Nollan and Dolan, the only exactions that will pass constitutional muster are
those with harms that are easily defined and quantified at the instant of permit approval.127 Thus, nebulous yet necessary city planning benefits such as
“traffic-reducing rights-of-way and safety-inducing shore protection
measures” may never happen, and the impacts of intensified land use will go
unmitigated.128 Before Koontz, courts routinely deferred to local governmental planning efforts in regulatory takings disputes because they recognized
that imposing exactions with a broad, comprehensive plan in mind is less
likely to be extortionate than when the exaction is imposed in a targeted way
toward a particular developer.129 After Koontz, lower courts no longer have
that discretion, and city development will suffer for it.
B.

An Impossible Standard

When a land use agency denies a permit before a condition has attached, no property has been taken. The landowner might argue that his
right to use the property in the manner in which he wishes has been taken,
but this is not a takings claim; government infringement on personal rights
sounds in due process and would be best resolved with a due process standard.130 The Court’s insistence on a takings analysis leads to a confusing
standard that lower courts will have difficulty applying in local contexts
ironically, diminished property rights for landowners. Local context, in other words, often
frustrates and complicates constitutional rules.”).
126. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 542; see also Amicus Brief at
14, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 11-1447) 2012
WL 6755147, at *14 (“Petitioner’s proposal also would have perverse, harmful consequences
for property owners seeking to develop their property for profit. Conditions attached to development authorizations often provide an effective and relatively inexpensive way of addressing the negative externalities associated with development. Thus, exactions and other
conditions attached to development approvals often produce ‘win-win solutions’ that allow
developers to achieve all or most of their development objectives while addressing the legitimate concerns of public officials and their constituents about the adverse effects of development.”).
127. See Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 542.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 530; Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 611–12.
130. For a discussion of how the Due Process Clause is meant to encompass broader
rights than the simple taking of property, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 984 (2000). See also Amicus Brief at 28, Koontz v. St.
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 11-1447), 2012 WL 6771846, at
*28.
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because cities develop plans to meet their specific needs, often without considering the large-scale constitutional implications that may arise should a
property owner challenge that plan.131
1.

Are Exactions Examined Under Takings or Due Process?

Exactions are designed to prevent an immediately-obvious potential
harm.132 When this is the case, Nollan and Dolan fall easily into place because the exaction attached to the permit, intended to mitigate the potential
harm of the development, will only be allowed if it is linked both qualitatively (bearing an essential nexus) and quantitatively (roughly proportional)
to this potential harm.133 Thus, under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause,
the condition attached to the permit was an actual physical taking of identifiable property.134 In both Nollan and Dolan, the plaintiffs lost the right to
exclude members of the public from their property.135 Without question,
these conditions would require compensation if they had not been imposed
within the context of exactions.136 When a condition fails before it is approved, however, no identifiable property has been lost.137 According to the
Court, there is no difference between a condition attached before or after
approval; in each situation, a local government has conditioned approval of
a land use permit on an unconstitutional condition.138 But whether a condition has attached prior to approval, meaning definite property has attached
to the application, is critical to determining the condition’s constitutionality.139
131. See Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 615–16.
132. Mulvaney, Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 521.
133. Id.
134. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987).
135. Dolan, 512 U.S. 374; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825; see also ARNOLD & TRACHT, supra note
39 at § 2:82.
136. The right to intensified land use is the “just compensation” for an exactions taking.
See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 639.
137. Id. at 639–40; see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005)
(ruling that in order to challenge a regulation as a taking, the plaintiff may only assert: 1) a
physical taking; 2) a total regulatory taking; 3) a Penn Central taking; or 4) an exaction that
violates Nollan and Dolan).
138. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013);
Lambert v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045, 1048 (2000); Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 639–40.
139. Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 639–40. An amicus brief submitted in
Koontz provides a helpful comparison: “[T]here is all the difference in the world between
when government contemplates taking some action and when it actually takes that action. A
citizen may ponder trespassing on his or her neighbor’s land but such an unneighborly
thought is different as a matter of law from an actual trespass.” Amicus Brief at 14, Koontz v.

536

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

A court can only know what property will be taken after the land use
regulator has identified the specific exaction required for permit approval.140
The Fifth Amendment states “private property [shall not] be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”141 When an exaction fails before it is approved no “private property” has been taken for “public use.”142 Unlike in
Nollan and Dolan, in Koontz, the District did not specifically identify the
property to be taken in exchange for Mr. Koontz’s permit approval; instead,
the permit had been denied.143 Even if the District’s actions were extortionate or unreasonable, Mr. Koontz’s property had not been taken for Fifth
Amendment purposes.144 Constitutionally, Mr. Koontz’s claim sounded in
due process, not takings.145 The Supreme Court of Florida recognized this
distinction in refusing to expand Nollan and Dolan when it heard Mr.
Koontz’s case.146
Justice Kagan recognized the flaws in the Court’s overruling of the
Florida decision, not only in the confusing application of the Takings Clause
to property that had not been taken, but also in applying the same standard
to both real property dedication and monetary exactions.147 As highlighted in
Koontz, exactions law falls into its own category of regulatory takings,
which, by virtue of the way it operates, creates confusion.148
2.

Exactions Are Considered Under a Special Standard

The Nollan/Dolan test only applies to a narrow category of land use
law: exactions cases.149 This unique framework exclusive to exactions has
resulted in legal confusion since the landmark cases were decided.150 First of
all, the standard places a greater burden on land use agencies to defend the
condition attached to a permit than it does in justifying the regulations that
St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 11-1447) 2012 WL 6755147,
at *8.
140. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 639–40.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
142. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 639–40.
143. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see also Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note
34, at 639–40.
144. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 639–40.
145. See id.
146. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2011), reh’g
denied (Jan. 4, 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012), and rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).
147. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2607 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
148. See infra Part III.B.3.
149. See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); BLAESSER &
WIENSTEIN, supra note 15, at § 3:31; Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 277–
78.
150. See Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 277–78.
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allow the agencies to require a permit for expansion in the first place. 151
Secondly, there is so much confusion about when and where the standard
applies that agencies and developers alike are unable to rely on its application in any given scenario.152 Koontz, then, was the Court’s effort to delineate and define the standard,153 but clearly further efforts are needed.
Before Koontz, when a local land use regulator chose to deny a permit
rather than condition approval on an exaction, courts hearing the case would
apply the traditional regulatory takings standard from Penn Central.154
When the government attached a condition, however, courts would apply
the intermediate scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan.155 This heightened scrutiny
allows courts to ensure that the condition bears a reasonable relationship to
the government’s purpose in attaching the condition.156 Exactions law, then,
though ostensibly falling into the category of takings law, currently bears
more of a resemblance to a due process claim.157
In Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A.,158 the Court made an attempt to reconcile
takings law with exactions law.159 The Court’s exactions decisions, according to the Court in Lingle, are no more than a check on government efforts
to impose the functional equivalent of a taking of property via a regulatory
act without compensation.160
3.

The Courts’ Role in Exactions Disputes

As Justice Kagan stated, the Koontz decision inserts the judiciary into
the “very heart” of local governance.161 Exactions law was fairly adequately
regulated prior to the Court’s involvement in Nollan and Dolan, whether
through state court decisions or state statutes.162 The state court decisions
regulated exactions by holding either that the local government did not have
the authority to place certain conditions on development or by holding the
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 15, at § 3:31.
154. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 641.
155. Id.
156. See Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 731.
157. BLAESSER & WEINSTEIN, supra note 15, at § 3:31; see also Koontz v. St. Johns River
Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2608–09 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Finally, a court
can use the Penn Central framework, the Due Process Clause, and (in many places) state law
to protect against monetary demands, whether or not imposed to evade Nollan and Dolan,
that simply ‘go[] too far.’”) (quoting Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
158. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
159. Id.; Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 731.
160. Lingle, 544 U.S. 528; Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 731.
161. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2612 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
162. See Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 735–36; see also Mulvaney,
Exactions for the Future, supra note 5, at 12.
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condition unconstitutional per the state constitution.163 State legislation
might allow exactions but would place limitations on them.164
As stated earlier, by placing failed exactions into takings jurisprudence,
state courts are left with an unworkable standard.165 Because no condition
has been attached to the permit, courts will be forced to engage in “judicial
speculation on hypothetical exactions and their hypothetical impacts” in
order to review these cases that may or may not present an actual controversy.166 Additionally, once the land use agency denies a permit, the developer
is left with the same rights that he had before he applied, that is, the right to
the un-intensified use of his property.167 He therefore has not forfeited anything; nothing was taken.168 Thus, because nothing has been identified as
taken, a court is unable to determine if the permit denial violates the takings
tests provided in Nollan and Dolan.169 The court can only provide the designated remedy of just compensation if the permit denial violates the
Nollan/Dolan test.170 Assuming this remedy is appropriate, the public should
then be entitled to gain the property the court awarded just compensation
for, as just compensation is only provided for property taken for public
use.171 If a court awards just compensation for a failed exaction, there is
nothing for the public to receive.172
The courts’ role, then, is especially called into question when awarding
remedies.173 It is impossible to determine just compensation when nothing
has been taken.174 The remedies outlined in Nollan and Dolan only make
sense when actual, identifiable property or a property interest is taken fol163. See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., Inc., 355 So. 2d 363, 364–65
(Ala. 1978) (invalidating as beyond statutory authority fees imposed in lieu of park land
dedication); Haugen v. Gleason, 359 P.2d 108, 111 (Or. 1961) (invalidating fee imposed on
residential developers in lieu of park land dedication because failure of ordinance to limit use
of funds to benefit made the fee a tax, which the county had no statutory authority to impose); Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 735–36.
164. See Fenster, Regulating Land Use, supra note 53, at 735–36.
165. See Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 301–02.
166. Id. at 301.
167. Id. at 302.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 302–03.
170. Id.
171. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 301–03. The Florida District
Court Judge used slightly more colorful terms: “[I]n what parallel legal universe or deep
chamber of Wonderland’s rabbit hole could there be a right to just compensation for the
taking of property under the Fifth Amendment when no property of any kind was ever taken
by the government and none ever given up by the owner?” St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist.
v. Koontz, 5 So. 3d 8, 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
172. Mulvaney, Proposed Exactions, supra note 101, at 302.
173. See, e.g., ARNOLD & TRACHT, supra note 39, at § 2:82.
174. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2597 (2013).
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lowing a negotiation with a land use regulatory agency.175 Extortionate demands might warrant a constitutional remedy, but this remedy must flow
from another source of law.176
C.

A Better Method: Local Governments Are in a Better Position to Regulate

These issues raise concerns about the role of courts in resolving disputes between landowners and local government. Resolving land use disagreements in court leaves parties tied up in the lengthy litigation process
while community growth and development stagnates.177 Likewise, court
decisions result in inconsistent and arbitrary standards concerning land use
regulation, as seen in Koontz.178 Solutions to these problems are better left to
the branches of government capable of applying local rather than national
standards, either in the form of a state legislature or an executive agency.
Unlike lawsuits, which can tie parties up in litigation for many years
and provide untenable results that leave everybody unhappy, state legislatures and municipal agencies know local needs and plans and have the power to set specific standards that give better guidance as to what constitutes an
acceptable exaction.179 Indeed, two states have attempted codification of the
Nollan/Dolan standard.180 While these statutes provide clear guidance for
courts, developers, and local land use regulators, they run the risk of forcing
all permit applications into the same fit, still leaving little discretion to the
land use regulator.181
A strict standard enforced across the board, however, is more desirable
than the varying and often incomprehensible standards determined in the
courtroom.182 Even if some permits are ultimately denied despite the owner’s flexibility regarding a condition that violates the statute, at least owners
and city agencies are on notice as to what will constitute an outrageous condition and are not tying up the courts with easy-to-resolve yet ongoing cas175. See, e.g., ARNOLD & TRACHT, supra note 39, at § 2:82; Fenster, Failed Exactions,
supra note 34, at 625, 640.
176. See, e.g., ARNOLD & TRACHT, supra note 39, at § 2:82.
177. See, e.g., Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 643–44; see also Amicus
Brief, supra note 126, at *13 (“Petitioner’s proposed expansion of the Nollan/Dolan doctrine
is also unworkable because it would foster frequent, unsolvable controversies. Was the permit denied because of the government’s inability to negotiate acceptable exactions, or for
some other reason?”).
178. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608–09 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
179. See, e.g., Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 643–44.
180. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-500.12 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9a-508
(West 2013).
181. Mulvaney, Remnants, supra note 113, at 221.
182. See, e.g., Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 645–48.
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es.183 And, in the event the case does ultimately go to court, the judge will
have a voter-approved standard to apply.184
Discretion and flexibility in the permit process, however, are essential
for city planning commissions to meet their long-term goals.185 By forcing
these regulators to consider all permits in the strict light of Nollan and Dolan, and now Koontz, even supposing the cases had been codified to provide
clear guidelines, the regulators are left with scant options in denying or approving permit applications in sync with an overarching and long-term
plan.186
Some states have enacted statutes that provide a bit more leeway by
listing factors land use regulators may consider in approaching these conditional applications.187 A combination of both should be considered: a clear
definition of what will amount to an extortionate demand coupled with factors land use regulators are allowed to consider during negotiations. This
combination will put local governments and developers on notice as to what
is permitted and will give review boards a workable standard when the inevitable dispute arises. Additionally, should the review boards’ decisions be
appealed to a judicial court, the courts will also have more guidance concerning the land use agency’s intent in denying the application.
On that note, it would be beneficial in dealing with these disputes to
take them out of the court’s jurisdiction until administrative review has been
exhausted. Administrative review boards, like local governments, are more
familiar with the goals of both developers and land use regulators and are in
a better position than courts to negotiate a compromise likely to be amenable to both parties.188 These local officials can use discretion and flexibility,
not only to manage workable compromises, but also to alleviate local voter
anxiety concerning new developments and the potential effects on property

183. See, e.g., id. at 647. (“Another reason to use formulas to determine impact fees and
exactions is that formulas, once developed, can be used repeatedly for land use applications,
thereby simplifying regulatory practices. Indeed, legislative formulas applied mechanically
can settle disputes wholesale, as opposed to the more time-consuming and variable approach
of designing individualized exactions. To attract development, pro-growth communities have
made their formulas transparent to create a predictable and palatable project approval regime.
Moreover, municipalities that establish formulas based upon comprehensive, long-range
plans are less likely to face takings liability. Courts are likely to find such formulas persuasive insofar as they appear to be part of an ordered, considered regulatory scheme rather than
an effort to obtain concessions from individual landowners.”).
184. See id. at 645–48.
185. See Fenster, Failed Exactions, supra note 34, at 643–44.
186. See Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 645–48.
187. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:21 (2012). These factors include a time frame
for issuing the exaction, a method of appeal, and a provision for waiver of process, among
others. Id.
188. See Fenster, Takings Formalism, supra note 2, at 645–48.
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values.189 By keeping judicial remedy as a final resort, many of these land
use disputes can be resolved efficiently and painlessly by those best situated
to affect an outcome favorable to both parties, not to mention the taxpayers.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Koontz will have a drastic impact on
municipality development. Courts are left with forcing an unworkable, ruleformalist standard onto a variety of uniquely local issues. This will result in
the stagnation of beneficial city development as developers, land use regulators, and courts alike struggle with the ramifications of this decision. Permit
negotiations between land use regulators and developers will cease as regulators become wary of the heightened scrutiny now being applied to negotiations. Additionally, courts will be forced into local land use battles where
they are unfamiliar with the needs of the developer and the goals of the local
governments.
Nevertheless, cities should not be given a free pass to exact property
rights from landowners however they see fit. But when a condition on a land
use permit is truly extortionate, when a landowner’s rights have truly been
impinged upon, courts should avoid the unnecessary confusion involved in
analyzing the claim under takings jurisprudence. There is already a constitutional remedy in place for redress of wronged rights: the claim sounds in due
process, not takings.
A better solution is necessary. By keeping review of permit conditions
within the discretion of the state legislature or a local review board, with
litigation as a last resort, the goals of both developers and city planners can
be heard, and a compromise satisfactory to both parties can be reached
without pigeonholing the permit into Nollan and Dolan.
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